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Abstract
This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of discrete choice
problems in which the choice set is strategically pre-selected by a third-party
advisor or expert. It delineates measures of eciency loss arising from (i) the
sets of relevant choice attributes being imperfectly aligned between ultimate
beneciary of the choice outcome and third-party expert, and (ii) pre-selected
choice-sets being uniform across ultimate beneciaries who dier in their sub-
jective evaluations of relevant choice attributes. And it identies inconsisten-
cies in estimation when strategically pre-selected choice sets are treated as
exogenous. Some applications to choice in healthcare and nancial services
markets are sketched.
Preliminary and Incomplete. Comments welcome.
Keywords: Discrete choice, expert, endogenous choice sets.
JEL classication: D120, C510, I110, G110.
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1 Introduction
As a by-product to some work I have done in the recent past on competition is-
sues in healthcare (Beckert et al. (2012)), and in particular on patients' choice of
hospital for elective medical procedures, I have become interested more generally in
the econometric analysis of discrete choice outcomes when choice sets are endoge-
nous. By this, I am thinking of situations in which an \expert" (advisor or broker)
with arguably superior information strategically presents a set of pre-selected choice
alternatives to a decision maker (e.g. a general practitioner (GP) presents sets of
hospitals, out of the universe of all hospitals, for a patient to choose from for an
elective medical procedure). This proposed research is concerned with biases in es-
timation when the potential endogeneity of choice sets is ignored in the econometric
model that forms the basis of analysis. In the area of healthcare provision, the role
of GPs within the topology of National Health Service (NHS) funded services has
been enhanced by the Health and Social Care Act (2012) which gives GPs signicant
responsibilities for purchasing healthcare services in England. Consequently, there
is also increased substantive interest in understanding the impact of GPs on patient
choice and medical outcomes.
Endogeneity of choice sets is also an issue in the area of nancial decision mak-
ing. Here, a nancial advisor or broker may oer sets of nancial contracts to a
retail client (e.g. dierent investment funds or assets, out of all traded assets; or
dierent insurance products). This is also an area of regulatory interest. The then
Financial Services Authority1, for example, in its recent Retail Distribution Review
(RDR) proposed various changes to the remuneration, capital and independence
requirements for nancial advisors. Some real estate decisions have similar char-
acteristics, as do certain types of art purchases. Chamley (2004) summarizes the
growing theoretical microeconomic literature on the role of experts in consumer and
investor choice decisions.
Finally, strategic composition of choice sets emerges as a feature of online mar-
kets. Social media platforms are at the point of becoming gateways to online service
providers. For example, Facebook in the future may host contents of selected online
1Now, Financial Conduct Authority.
2
news media2 and already now acts as platform for app-install ads3. Furthermore,
antitrust authorities have focussed on Googles competition with so-called vertical, or
specialised, search services, such as comparison shopping sites, travel search engines
and search sites aimed at local services, out of concern that rivals are disadvantaged
because Google's search platform allegedly gives preferential treatment to results
from its own services; this concern has culminated in the launch of a formal inquiry
by the European Commission's Directorate for Competition into Google's shopping
searches4. In these instances, the design of the online platform, acting as a gateway
to services relevant to their ultimate users, is likely governed by revenue considera-
tions of the platform operator - such as revenue from advertisement or proprietary
services - that are not aligned with those relevant to the service users.
Exogeneity of the set of choice alternatives is an implicit assumption in conven-
tional discrete choice analysis (McFadden (1974))5. To my knowledge, the implica-
tions for econometric analysis of endogenous choice sets have not been investigated
in detail, and no general econometric choice model exists that allows for endogenous
choice sets. McFadden (1977) oers two conditions - positive and uniform condition-
ing, characterizing an exogenous selection mechanism - that are sucient to yield
consistent estimates in the presence of exogenously limited choice sets; Santos et
al. (2013) refer to this result as justication for the consistency of their maximum
likelihood estimator with imposed choice sets that are subsets of the true choice
sets. From an econometric perspective, the endogeneity of the set of choice alterna-
tives constitutes a potential sample selection problem that tends to bias estimation
results. This is similar to the well-known issue of incidental truncation (Heckman
(1976)) whereby decision outcomes of interest are only observed for a selected sub-
sample and where failure to properly model the sample selection mechanism induces
the estimates of the outcome relationship to be biased and inconsistent. Similar is-
2See New York Times, 24 March 2015;
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/business/media/facebook-may-host-news-sites-content.html
3See New York Times, 26 March 2015;
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/technology/debunking-the-latest-predictions-of-facebooks-demise.html
4See, for example, Financial Times, 02 and 15 April 2015;
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/97a4dc62-e360-11e4-9a82-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3XIZ3NHfN
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c2b2840-d8d3-11e4-8a23-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3W8LdSMDi
5See Maddala (1983) for a general introduction and overview.
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sues also arise in the analysis of endogenous sample attrition (Hausman and Wise
(1979)).
This note works out some preliminary results that demonstrate the source of
potential inconsistency of estimators when the endogeneity of choice sets is ignored.
2 Micro-level Econometric Model
2.1 Basic Setup and Unconstrained Pre-Selection
Consider a decision maker i who is modelled to make a discrete choice out of a set
of alternatives J . Suppose this set is presented to him by an advisor who arguably
possesses superior information, say on the hard-to-assess quality of all possible choice
alternatives, collected in the set H. The role of the advisor is to pre-select J  H
for the benet of the ultimate decision maker i.
Consider the expert's selection mechanism. Denote the expert's latent assess-
ment of alternative j's net benet by v?j ; this could incorporate anticipated benets
accruing to i, any benets accruing to the expert as a result of incentivization
schemes put in place by the producer of j; or any benets accruing to the expert's
reputation from promoting alternative j. Suppose that the expert includes j in J
if, and only if, v?j > 0:
v?j = j   j;
vj = 1fv?j>0g; j 2 H;
where j denotes the measurable component of v
?
j , j is unobserved by the econome-
trician, and vj is a binary inclusion indicator, taking value one when the expert's net
benet assessment is positive so that j is included in J , and zero otherwise. Here, j
might capture, in particular, the unquantiable quality assessment of alternative j
by the expert, e.g. to the extent that it aects the expert's prospective reputation or
other subjective or \soft" attributes of alternative j. In this framework, the expert
has all the information relevant to him, each choice alternative is assessed by the
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expert individually and independently, and J = fj 2 H : vj = 1g. An alternative
pre-selection mechanism is outlined below.
Now consider the ultimate decision maker i. Suppose with any conceivable choice
alternative i associates an indirect conditional utility u?ij,
u?ij = ij + j + ij;
that comprises a measurable component ij, next to unobserved components j and
ij. Here, ij might capture observable attributes of j that relate directly to i, e.g.
geographic distance, coverage of specic idiosyncratic risks, etc. The unobservable
j might reect quality aspects of alternative j that are unobserved by the econome-
trician, as is i's idiosyncratic taste or preference for j, modelled by ij. The indirect
utility that decision maker i associates with alternative j is latent, but inference
about ij is possible to the extent that j is included in J , in that it can be observed
whether or not j is chosen by i. This is akin to the well-known incidental truncation
and non-random sample selection issues rst addressed in a regression framework
by Heckman (1976).
Consider the case when j and j are allowed to be correlated. This may arise
when unobserved quality aspects of alternative j are at least partly relevant to both,
the decision maker and the expert. This is plausibly so when the expert's reputation
hinges on matching up consumers, like i, with benecial choice outcomes, like j. It
can also arise from subjective assessments of \soft" (i.e. not easily quantiable or
measurable) attributes of the choice alternative.6 Then, given j 2 J ,
~u?ij := E

u?ijjj 2 J

= ij + E[jjj < j] + ij
= ij + (j) + ij;
where (j) = E[jjj < j] accounts for the eect of the expert's inclusion of j in J ;
for example, if j and j are bivariate standard normal with correlation  2 ( 1; 1),
6In the medical context, for example, patient and GP may dier in terms of what they consider
relevant aspects of the perioperative care and environment: The GP may focus on strictly medical
aspects (e.g. availability of specialist expertise for treating any comorbidities), while a patient
may focus also on psychosocial aspects (e.g. psychological support to mitigate anxiety) which may
aect somatic recovery.
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then this terms is the well-known Mills ratio, evaluated at j and pre-multiplied by
. The observed choice outcome is an indicator Yij taking value one when i choose
j out of J , i.e.
Yij = 1f~u?ij=maxf~u?ik;k2Jgg;
and the probability distribution of Yij is induced by distributional assumptions on
ij.
In applied work, it is advantageous to allow for an outside good, in a nested
model. Suppose the indirect utility of the outside option is normalized to zero.7.
Under extreme value type 1 assumptions on the ijs, this yields the well known
nested logit choice probabilities (McFadden (1978), Cardell (1991)),
Pr (Yij = 1) =
exp((ij + (j))=(1  ))P
k2J exp((ik + (k))=(1  ))
(exp((ij + (j))=(1  )))1  
1 +
P
k2J exp((ik + (k))=(1  ))
1 
=
exp((ij + (j))=(1  ))
exp(IiJ )
exp((1  )IiJ )
1 + exp((1  )IiJ ) ;
where  2 [0; 1) is a measure of the correlation of the indirect utilities of the inside
goods, and IiJ = ln
 P
k2J exp((ik + (k))=(1  ))

is the inclusive value of the
nest comprising the inside goods. The expression for Pr(Yij = 1) demonstrates that
the selection terms (j), j 2 J , constitute regressors that are omitted in analyses
that ignore strategic choice set pre-selection by an expert or advisor, provided cor-
relation between j and j cannot be ruled out and the selection terms vary across
j 2 J . Such omission will yield inconsistent maximum likelihood estimates, as a
consequence of model mis-specication.
Sovinsky Goeree (2008) presents a related model of random choice or consider-
ation sets at the level of the decision maker in which the probability of the decision
maker being informed about a choice alternative j takes the place of the inclusion
probability Pr(vj = 1). In her model of the US personal computer industry, these
probabilities are exogenously driven by product level advertising and consumer level
media exposure.8 Her model can be viewed as a special case of the present model
in which j and j are independent, conditional on observed attributes.
7This is the approach taken in Besanko et al (1990). An alternative is Anderson and de Palma
(1992) who specify the conditional utility of the outside option as an independent EV(0,1) variable,
i.e. as varying across decision makers
8See also Dinerstein et al. (2014) for an application to consumer search in internet commerce.
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This type of model is less compelling in situations when information about choice
alternatives is costly to acquire and disseminate. On the one hand, this renders
decision making complex for the uninformed layman. And on the other hand, it
creates a role for the informed expert, namely to reduce the complexity of the
decision process for the layman. The following subsection describes an alternative
model that captures these ideas.
2.2 Constrained Pre-Selection and Eciency
Suppose that j and ij share some, but not all attributes relevant to decision
maker i and the expert advisor. For example, in the hospital choice context, let xij
denote hospital j's attributes that are taken into account by both, wij those that
only matter to the patient, and zj those that only matter to the GP, in the role of
the expert. For simplicity, suppose that patient and GP attach the same weights
(coecients)  to xij, so that
ij = x
0
ij +w
0
ij;
ij = x
0
ij + z
0
j
where  and  are parameter vectors and ij, taking the role of j above, reects
the variation of x across i, in addition to j. The indirect utility of the ultimate,
layman decision maker is then
u?ij = ij + ij + ij
= x0ij +w
0
ij + ij + ij:
Condition on the event that the outside option is not chosen, i.e. focus the choice
of an alternative from the set of inside goods Ji pre-selected by the expert.9 Under
the i.i.d. EV(0,1) assumption on ij and assuming that decision maker i takes the
Gaynor et al. (2014) emphasize the promise this approach holds in healthcare industrial organiza-
tion research.
9In the setting of this subsection, J may also depend on i, to the extent that the expert espouses
the attributes that i values and that these vary with i, e.g. distance.
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pre-selected choice set Ji as given10,
Pr(Yij = 1jJi) = exp(ij + ij)P
k2J exp(ik + ik)
; j 2 Ji
= 0 o.w., i.e. j 62 Ji;
while, absent the pre-selection,
Pr(Yij = 1jH) = exp(ij + ij)P
k2H exp(ik + im)
j 2 H:
This implies that the divergence of the distribution of patient level choice outcomes
under pre-selection relative to their distribution absent pre-selection, in terms of the
Kullback-Leibler measure (relative entropy), is
D(JijjH;xi;wi) =
X
j2Ji
Pr(Yij = 1jJi) ln

Pr(Yij = 1jJi)
Pr(Yij = 1jH)

= ln
 X
k2H
exp(ik)
!
  ln
 X
m2Ji
exp(im)
!
= ln
 X
k2H
exp(xik +w
0
ij + ij)
!
  ln
 X
m2Ji
exp(x0im +w
0
im + im)
!
= IH(xi;wi)  IJi(xi;wi):
This divergence can be viewed as a loss in eciency that arises from reducing the
complexity of the choice problem, limiting it to evaluating Ji = #Ji alternatives,
instead of H = #H  Ji. This can be seen as a benet by uninformed laymen
decision makers if there are information acquisition and decision costs for them.
Comment : The Kullback - Leibler divergence for two measures P and Q is
D(P jjQ) = EP [ln(P=Q)] =
P
j P (j) ln(P (j)=Q(j)) and not symmetric. It requires
that Q(j) = 0 implies P (j) = 0, i.e. that Pr(Yij = 1jH) = 0 implies Pr(Yij = 1jJi) =
0. In the present model, this is plausible, and the reverse is neither plausible nor
true. This dictates how the two probability distributions enter the measure, i.e.
as D(JijjH;xi;wi), not as D(HjjJi;xi;wi). Typically, however, the divergence is
interpreted as Q approximating P , i.e. as fPr(Yij = 1jH); j 2 Hg approximating
fPr(Yij = 1jJi); j 2 Hg. Here, the interpretation is the reverse. White (1994)
10This amounts to assuming that the decision maker behaves non-strategically and does not
question how the expert arrived at the pre-selection outcome Ji.
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oers an interpretation11 that, adapted to this model, implies that the divergence
measures the \surprise" from learning that decision outcomes are in fact governed
by fPr(Yij = 1jJi); j 2 Hg, rather than by fPr(Yij = 1jH); j 2 Hg.
Suppose that, from the expert's perspective, there is a constant unit cost C > 0
of including an alternative into Ji. This cost may be specic to the expert. For
example, in the context of hospital choice in the UK where a GP (practice) plays
the role of the expert, this cost might be expected to be a function of practice list
size, the number of GPs in the practice, their work experience and whether they
obtained their qualication in the UK or abroad. It imposes a constraint that can
be thought of as the eort the expert needs to exert in order to explain the features,
pros and cons of the alternative to the decision maker. Let P denote the set of all
partitions of H, i.e. P = fG  H : #G  #Hg. Furthermore, suppose the expert's
objective in selecting Ji is to minimize the eciency loss, or \surprise" in the sense of
White's interpretation, on the basis of his own assessments of the choice alternatives
in H, taking account the cost constraint of including alternatives. Let the expert's
assessment of i's valuation of alternative j be v?ij = ij+
2ij, where ij captures the
expert's incomplete information about i's preferences, i.e. 2 reects his uncertainty
about decision maker i's valuation of alternative j.12 Just as the cost parameter C,
the variance parameter 2 might also be specic to the expert; for example, in the
case of GP (practices) in the role of the expert, this might be a function of the
heterogeneity of patients within the practice list. More specically, suppose that
the econometric error term ij in u
?
ij can be decomposed into uncertainty 
x
ij + 
x
ij
with regard to the attributes taken into account by both, decision maker and expert,
and uncertainty wij + 
w
ij with regard to attributes that only matter to the decision
maker,
ij = 
x
ij + 
w
ij + 
x
ij + 
w
ij ;
where xij and 
w
ij are those parts of the econometrician's uncertainty about the two
parts of ij that are known to the expert, while 
x
ij and 
w
ij are unknown to both. From
11See p.31; his Assumption 3.4 is satised because fPr(Yij = 1jH); j 2 Hg is a probability
distribution.
12It is worth emphasizing that it is necessary to allow for uncertainty about the laymen decision
maker's valuations on the part of the expert because absent such uncertainty the expert would
simply choose on behalf of the laymen.
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the perspective of the expert who cares only about the utility contribution related
to x, only the former matters. So, ij = 
x
ij. Consequently, from the perspective of
the econometrician, in the model for the expert xij matters in addition to ij.
Assuming the ij are i.i.d. extreme value type 1, the distribution of choice
outcomes from the expert's perspective is given by logit choice probabilities based
on attributes x and z. Denote the econometrician's incomplete information about
the expert specic relevant attributes z by zj . Once the fijgi2H are integrated out,
the econometrician's remaining uncertainty with regard to the expert's assessment
of alternative j is therefore ij = 
x
ij + 
z
j . This leads to
Ji = argminG2P D(GjjH;xi; z) + C#G:
The solution to this problem is to order the alternatives in H according to their
indirect utilities,
exp

i(1:H) + i(1:H)


= exp
 
x0i(1:H) + z
0
(1:H) + i(1:H)

!
   
 exp

i(H:H) + i(H:H)


= exp
 
x0i(H:H) + z
0
(H:H) + i(H:H)

!
(?)
and to include the ones up to the point that
Ji = arg max
h2f1; ;Hg
(
ln
 
hX
k=1
exp

i(k:H) + i(k:H)

!
  ln
 
h 1X
m=1
exp

i(m:H) + i(m:H)

!
 C
)
= argmax
h
8<:  ln
0@1  exp

i(h:H)+i(h:H)


Ph
m=1 exp

i(m:H)+i(m:H)


1A  C
9=;
This also implies that
  ln
0@1  exp

i(k:H)+i(k:H)


Ph
m=1 exp

i(m:H)+i(m:H)


1A  C for k = 1;    ; Ji:
It is at this stage of pre-selection that the distinction between the expert and
the layman decision maker emerges and can be dened: The expert has sucient
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information and expertise to establish a ranking (?) of the alternatives in H without
cost, while the layman decision maker does not. This distinction is an implicit
assumption in the present setup. The distinction creates a role for the expert,
namely to pre-select and thereby narrow down the set of choice alternatives in order
to render the layman's choice problem less complex and more tractable.
The set Ji resulting from the expert's pre-selection may dier, however, from the
one that would be chosen if the assessment were based on ij (encompassing xi and
wi), instead of ij (encompassing xi and z), i.e. if the decision maker's and expert's
assessment criteria were perfectly aligned, in the sense that they were to consider
the same set of attributes of the choice alternatives as decision relevant. Denote the
choice set based on fijg by Ji, and the one that would have been pre-selected on
the basis of fijg by Ji. The eciency loss due to pre-selection by the expert can
then be cast as
i = D(JijjH;xi;wi)
= IH(xi;wi)  IJi(xi;wi)
= IH(xi;wi)  IJi(xi;wi) + IJi(xi;wi)  IJi(xi;wi)
= D(JijjH;xi;wi) +D(JijjJi;xi;wi):
The rst term captures the eciency loss due to the reduction in complexity of the
choice problem, while the second term captures the additional eciency loss arising
from a misalignment of assessment criteria between decision maker and expert which
results in a choice set Ji which is suboptimal when evaluated on the basis of the
attributes x and w relevant to the decision maker and ultimate beneciary of the
choice outcome.
The econometric implications of this model of constrained pre-selection for the
econometric model are similar to the ones of unconstrained pre-selection. The econo-
metrician cannot observe the ranking of the alternatives included in Ji. From the
inequalities (?) above, the set fijgj2Ji must satisfy the necessary condition for
inclusion of the jth alternative, so that
G(Ji;i; C) =
(
fijgj2Ji :   ln
 
1  exp
 ij+ij

P
m2Ji exp
 
im+im

!  C)
Pr(Ji;C) = Pr (G(Ji;i; C)) :
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To the extent that ij is correlated with ij, i.e. to the extent that 
x
ij is non-zero
with positive probability, observing Ji is informative about ij, so that (i; C) =
E[ijjG(Ji;i; C)] accounts for pre-selection in this model, analogous to (i) in
the model with unconstrained pre-selection. Unlike in the model of unconstrained
pre-selection, the selection term here does not permit a closed-form solution and
needs to be simulated.
The pre-selected choice sets Ji vary across laymen i, to the extent that the
attributes considered by both, expert and layman, xij vary with i; e.g. distance
between i and hospital j. In practice, the expert may pre-select a uniform choice
set J at the outset on the basis of z and choice attributes x as they relate to the
average layman, and then oer this to all laymen who consult him. This wedge
between the pre-selected choice set based on average attributes, rather than those
specic to i, introduces yet another layer of potential ineciency into the choice
mechanism, so that the total ineciency measured by the KL divergence is
 =
X
i
[D(JjjJi;xi;wi) +D(JijjH;xi;wi) +D(JijjJi;xi;wi)]
=
X
i
[D(JjjJi;xi;wi) + i] :
Uniformity of the pre-selected choice set across i adds, for each layman i, an addi-
tional potential eciency to i.
3 Market-level Model
The same considerations apply when the micro-level econometric choice model is
aggregated to market levels, as in Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995). For ease of exposition, suppose ij = j for all decision makers i advised by
the expert. Then, the share of alternative j of the market dened or procured by
the expert, sj, is given by
sj =
exp((j + (j))=(1  ))
exp(IJ )
exp((1  )IJ )
1 + exp((1  )IJ ) :
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For s0 the analogously dened share of the outside good and sjjJ the market share
of j within the nest of inside goods, this yields
ln(sj)  ln(s0) = j + (j) +  ln(sjjJ ) + j;
where j is any part of j that is uncorrelated with j. Again, the selection term
(j) persists as a regressor that is omitted in the conventional estimating equation
that does not account for sample selection.
4 Data Requirements
An empirical illustration could either be based on micro-level choice data, within a
framework as in Section 2, or on market-level data, within a framework as in Section
3 of this note.
With regard to micro-level data, my initial plan was to use British Health Episode
Statistics (HES), as in earlier work. As already suggested, investigating the role of
general practitioners (GPs), as experts, is rather topical in the UK because the
Health and Social Care Act (2012) gives GPs signicant responsibilities for purchas-
ing healthcare services in England. In the HES data, recording National Health
Service funded medical procedures in England, patients can be linked to GPs, and
assuming that patients only choose from what their GP oers them and GPs only
oer alternatives that are taken up with positive probability, the sets J and H
can be constructed for each GP. Attributes of choice alternatives are also available
(e.g. from Dr Foster, Lang Buisson etc.), and some hypothesized GP incentivization
schemes can be identied (e.g. market-forces-factor based uplifts on reimbursements
accruing to certain foundation trust hospitals with residual prot motives). Unfor-
tunately, as a consequence of recent increased parliamentary scrutiny of health data
releases, the Department of Health is currently reviewing its data access procedures,
so that there is a risk that work on current and forthcoming HES data may be held
up.
An alternative I am investigating is similar data for Denmark, but it is my
current understanding that the Danish healthcare system is not yet subject to the
13
same market forces and competitive pressures that would be the ultimate substantive
motivation for this kind of research.
With regard to market level data, the choice data on employer-sponsored health
insurance in the US, used in Dafny, Ho and Varela (2013), might be ideal. Since both
employer plan oerings and employee plan selections are observed, this identies J
and the respective market shares, next to H. It is a bit unclear to me whether the
data contain attributes that are in j and not in j, and vice versa. I understand
that this is proprietary data, however.
5 Example
Consider a nancial advisor facing a client or advisee i, and contemplate this sit-
uation pre and post RDR, indexed by t = f0; 1g. Here, the client can be thought
of as a set of relevant characteristics (investment volume13, attitude towards risk,
socio-demographics); cast in this way, it is not necessary that the same individual
is seen to make decisions in both time periods, only that individuals with broadly
similar relevant characteristics are advised by the nancial advisor in both periods.
 H: The set of all nancial products the advisor has access to and hence could
conceivably suggest to i, both pre and post RDR; the two points of obser-
vation around the policy implementation should be close enough so that one
could argue that no materially new products appeared on the market and that
no relevant products were discontinued. Post RDR, in principle this ought
to be the entire market, but for all practical purposes this is presumable a
substantially smaller set for any given advisor. Empirically, it is presumably
not (much) wider than the set of products observed as being chosen post RDR
by the advisor's clients.
 Jit: The set of choice alternatives presented by the advisor to client i at time t.
This ought to be captured in the advisor's records and minutes of consultation
13This investment volume is assumed to be exogenous. This may be considered a strong assump-
tion, to the extent that some funds require minimum amounts to be invested, etc..
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meetings with the client.
 ijt: This is a function of attributes of product j that are stipulated to govern
the advisor's decision on whether or not to include product j in Jit at time t.
Such attributes are likely to be the riskiness of product j, relative to client i's
risk tolerance; the commission accruing to the advisor in the event i purchases
product j, possibly expressed as a percentage of funds invested. Collect these
attributes as vector zijt. Typically, ijt would be specied as a linear function
in zijt, say ijt = z
0
ijtt, where t is a vector of coecients of the same dimen-
sion as zijt; its elements capture the impact that the corresponding product
attribute has on the advisor's decision at time t on whether or not to include
product j in the set of choice alternatives presented to i in the consultation.
 ijt: This is a function of attributes of product j 2 Jit that are stipulated to
govern client i's product choice at time t. This function may or may not be
dierent pre and post RDR; this may depend on whether the RDR induced
some change in consumer awareness and literacy. One would expect that the
set of products Jit presented to client i is chosen by the advisor such that all its
elements entail risk commensurate with i's risk tolerance; so there ought not
be any (or much) variation in product level risk across Jit. Product attributes
that are likely to matter are the product specic acquisition and exit costs,
requirements on minimum holding period, liquidity. Collect these attributes as
vector xijt, and adopt again a linear specication for ijt, say ijt = x
0
ijtt; here,
it would also be possible to allow for heterogeneity across clients, i.e. to let
the coecient vector it vary across clients, depending on socio-demographic
characteristics (random coecient model).
Estimation of this model would yield estimates of a number of parameters of
interest for an empirical assessment of the eect the RDR had on the way nancial
advice is given and, more generally, on consumer level nancial decision making:
(i) It would permit assessment of the extent to which advisors place dierent
weight on product level risk attributes and remuneration implications before
and after the policy initiative; such dierences would be expected to manifest
themselves in dierences in the estimates ^t of t for the two periods.
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(ii) It would also permit assessment of whether advisees themselves change their
evaluation of product attributes over time, as a result of enhanced awareness
and nancial literacy, possibly attributable to the nature of advice given on
the presented choice options; such dierences would be expected to manifest
themselves in dierences of the estimates ^t of t for the two periods (or, in
a random coecient model, in the estimates of the distribution of it across
customers i for the two periods).
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